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WORKING TOWARDS A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF ATTENTION DEFICIT
HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER AS A LEGAL
DISABILITY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
Michael W. Sweeney
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, millions of Americans have been diagnosed
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).' This condition
can be characterized by a number of symptoms: inability to focus,
being easily distracted, irritability, short attention span,
disorganization, difficulty following directions, and distortions of time-
sense.2  ADHD is now a commonly diagnosed disorder recognized
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1. See David W. Lannetti, Extending Coverage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) to Individuals with Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity
Disorder: A Demonstration of Inadequate Legislative Guidance, 15 LAB. LAw. 231,
234 (1999). Over the past decade, it is estimated that fifteen million American
adults are affected by ADHD. Id. While the official name of the condition is
ADHD, many professionals still refer to it by its previous name, attention deficit
disorder (ADD). See Attention Deficit Disorder, at http://www.addadhd.org/
ADHDattention-deficit.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004). "The disorder's name has
changed as a result of scientific advances and the findings of careful field trials."
Id. Researchers believe that ADHD "is not one specific disorder with different
variations." Id. For the purposes of this article, no distinction is made between the
former name of this medical condition, attention deficit disorder and its current
name, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
2. See THOM HARTMANN, ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER: A DIFFERENT
PERCEPTION 5-7 (Publisher's Group West 1997).
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increasingly by both social scientists and the medical community.3 As a
result, ADHD advocates have worked hard to bring the condition into
the "spotlight" of American public policy, reflecting an increased
interest in the range of social effects posed by its symptoms.4 To date,
most of the attention regarding ADHD policy has centered on the
classroom environment and helping children overcome learning
challenges associated with the condition.5  However, recent
consideration has been given to the impact of ADHD in the workplace
and its possible link with work performance difficulties.6
ADHD advocates have paid close attention to these recent studies,
causing widespread speculation regarding potential disability rights in
the employment context. Specifically, many ADHD sufferers who
3. Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder - Are We Overmedicating Our
Children?: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. 101
(2003) [hereinafter ADHD Hearings] (statement of E. Clarke Ross, Chief
Executive Officer, CHADD (Children and Adults with Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder)) ("In 1998, the American Medical Association
published an exhaustive review of the scientific literature concerning AD/HD,
concluding that the disorder is real and that while there may be a problem with
over diagnosis, there is a greater problem with underdiagnosis.").
4. See KATHLEEN G. NADEAU, ADD IN THE WORKPLACE: CHOICES,
CHANGES, AND CHALLENGES 5 (1997).
5. Id. at 1; see also Lannetti, supra note 1, at 233 ("Teachers and parents have
always been aware that some children are particularly fidgety or overactive.").
6. See generally NADEAU, supra note 4.
7. Id. at 208-14. Dr. Nadeau, an advocate for ADHD individuals, assumes a
broad range of rights for ADHD employees in the workplace and explains how
they are "legally protected in the workplace as person[s] with disabilit[ies]."
However, this article cautions against such assumptions, as many courts are
hesitant to recognize ADHD's legal disability status. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Howard
Univ., No. CIV.A.98-1009, 1999 WL 1581759, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1999) ("Courts
are divided on the issue of whether ADD is a disability under the ADA."). Much
of the hesitation can be attributed to disputes over whether ADHD is an abnormal
medical condition or not. As one researcher notes, "The more I've come to
understand AD[H]D - both through my research into scientific literature and
through my own work with clients - the more I see it as an alternate and perfectly
natural way of brain wiring." LYNN WEISS, ADD ON THE JOB: MAKING YOUR
ADD WORK FOR You 5 (1996). Should a "natural way of brain wiring" really
constitute a protected disability? Another expert suggests that special treatment
for ADHD employees is not effective: "It is not a solution to apply a
disempowering label to [ADHD] people. It's not even a solution to throw some
drugs at them, or toss them into 'special' classrooms or give them workplace
'accommodations."' See THOM HARTMANN, HEALING ADD: SIMPLE EXERCISES
THAT WILL CHANGE YOUR DAILY LIFE 31 (1998). However, Dr. Nadeau views
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have been disciplined or terminated by an employer for poor work
performance feel that they have been treated unjustly because of the
uncontrollable effects of their condition.8 Moreover, they feel little is
being done by their employer to understand or accommodate this
ailment.9 Consequently, an increasing number of lawsuits have been
filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' ° by ADHD
employees claiming wrongful discrimination or termination." Many
employees feel justified filing such causes of action, but no widespread
consensus exists regarding treatment of this condition as a legal
disability for purposes of the statute." While the ADA considers
ADHD as an abnormal medical condition that requires special attention. She
responds to skeptics of the disorder by stating "AD[H]D is a genuine
neurobiological disorder, one that, if untreated, can cause enormous difficulty and
suffering in the lives of those who have it." NADEAU, supra note 4, at 9.
8. For specific cases discussing employees' perceived unjust treatment, see
infra note 11. See also NADEAU, supra note 4, at 210-11. Dr. Nadeau recommends
that ADHD employees retain a lawyer once their employers fail to meet their
needs through reasonable accommodation.
9. See cases cited infra note 11.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2002).
11. See, e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 77 (10th Cir. 2003) (ADHD
employee alleged his employer violated the ADA by terminating his employment,
failing to reasonably accommodate him, and harassing him); Robertson v. The
Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1998) (employee claimed employer
discriminated against him for failing to reasonably accommodate his ADHD); Bice
v. Lennox Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.02-342, 2003 WL 21018638, at *2 (E.D. La. May
5, 2003) (salesperson diagnosed with ADHD alleged employment discrimination);
Felten v. Eyemart Express, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 935, 936 (E.D. Wisc. 2003)
("Eyemart failed to accommodate [employee's] adult attention deficit disorder
(ADD) and improperly fired him from his position as general manager of one of
Eyemart's stores because of his ADD."); Todd v. McCahan, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1369,
1373 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ("Plaintiff contends that Defendants subjected him to
discrimination, harassment and retaliation due to his alleged disability, Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ('ADHD').").
12. See Ferrell v. Howard Univ., No. CIV.A.98-1009, 1999 WL 1581759, at *2
(D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1999) ("Courts are divided on the issue of whether ADD is a
disability under the ADA."). Some of the confusion regarding the legal treatment
of ADHD stems from conflicting reports regarding the true nature of this
condition. See ADHD Hearings, supra note 3, at 117 (statement of Dr. David
Fassler, American Psychiatric Association). This may cause judges to be cautious
in awarding disability status to ADHD. As Dr. David Fassler of the American
Psychiatric Association testified before Congress, "periodic waves of media
attention questioning the disorder's prevalence and treatment are confusing to the
public and understandably perplexing to legislators." Id.
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whether a legal disability exists on a case-by-case basis, 3 a mere
diagnosis of a medical condition is not sufficient to establish an
individual's disability status. 4 Recognition of ADHD as a disability
raises particular concerns for employers as its effects are often difficult
to distinguish from routine human behaviors otherwise subject to
discipline. 5
This Note will evaluate whether ADHD is likely to be treated as an
ADA-covered disability by analyzing this condition under the ADA's
statutory scheme. Additionally, the Note will examine a number of
ADHD cases decided in recent years under the ADA. In the end, this
Note will determine whether or not ADHD employees should expect
their condition to be treated as a disability under the ADA.
The determination of the condition's "disability" status is significant
because it is the first analytical step for any ADA cause of action. If
ADHD is not found to constitute a disability under the ADA, no
wrongful action will be available. This area is in dire need of clarity
given the emergence of ADHD as a recognized medical condition, 6
13. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (holding that
an individual's disability status must be made on a case-by-case basis).
14. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.20), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,741 (1991))
("The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily
based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on
the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual."). See also Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185 (2002) ("It is insufficient for
individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test to merely submit
evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.").
15. Employers frequently encounter situations in which an employee's
behavior or personality traits lead to workplace difficulties. ADHD employees
may be particularly susceptible to these instances. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 10-
36. If ADHD is a recognized disability, it may be difficult for employers to
distinguish its symptoms from those of natural human behavior which are
otherwise subject to discipline. Furthermore, ADHD researchers acknowledge
that employers do not have time to dissect and analyze "every misunderstanding
or hurtful situation" that is faced by an ADHD employee. See id. at 14. Still,
employers reserve the right to discipline or discharge their employees in
accordance with company handbooks and policies. See, e.g., Lileikis v. SBC
Ameritech, Inc., 84 Fed. Appx. 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[Depressed employee]
was fired because of her poor attendance record and because she eventually
stopped showing up for work, not because she was disabled.").
16. See ADHD Hearings, supra note 3, at 70 (statement of Dr. Richard K.
Nakamura, Acting Director, National Institute of Mental Health, National
Institute of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("All of the
major medical associations and governmental agencies recognize ADHD as a
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the rising number of employment complaints," and the lack of
consensus among courts.'8 Moreover, the issue will gain importance as
employers receive an increased number of ADHD-diagnosed
employees, and courts begin to hear more ADHD discrimination
cases.
1. UNDERSTANDING ATTENTION DEFICIT HYPERACTIVITY
DISORDER (ADHD)
Before conducting the legal analysis of any potential disability, it is
necessary to understand the nature of an individual's medical
condition. This is especially important under the ADA because
coverage for individuals extends beyond those with so called
"traditional handicaps."' 9 The nature and limitations of a condition are
crucial determinants of whether that condition achieves disability
status under the ADA.
ADHD has been described by one psychologist as a complex
condition that requires diagnosis by an experienced professional.
2 In
this regard, ADHD does not seem dissimilar from any other medical
disease or condition. However, no theory on the cause of ADHD has
21
been proven, and it remains an open topic for discussion. Several
propositions have emerged over the years.
22  The earliest theories
characterized ADHD as a "diseased state" associated with brain
damage or dysfunction.23 This early characterization caused ADHD to
be grouped with other mental illnesses and psychiatric disorders that
genuine disorder because the scientific evidence indicating it is so overwhelming..
• .") (quoting R.A. Barkley, International Consensus Statement on ADHD, January
2002, 5 CLINICAL CHILD FAM. PSYCH. REV. 89,89-111 (2002)).
17. See supra note 11.
18. See supra note 12.
19. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (S. Comm. on Labor and Human
Res.). This underlying philosophy of the statute is important as it is designed to
provide coverage to new conditions and disabilities. Moreover, it does not force
the courts to restrict their decisions in favor of a narrow group of people,
particularly where it would appear that justice demands review of an individual's
condition. This notion of a "case-by-case basis" has empowered the court to
consider all conditions in light of varying circumstances while fulfilling a major
goal of the legislation--broadening of statutory protection to more individuals.
20. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 8.
21. See HARTMANN, supra note 7, at 46-49.
22. Id. at 47.
23. See HARTMANN, supra note 2, at 21.
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were commonly connected with early trauma or childhood abuse.24
Even in the latter part of the twentieth century, when ADHD received
official recognition as a specific disorder, children diagnosed with the
condition were thought of as "bad people" and grouped with
troublemakers.25
Recent research shows a high incidence of ADHD among parents of
26children who have been diagnosed with the same condition. This
causes some researchers to speculate that ADHD is a learned
behavior, following a pattern similar to child or spousal abuse.27 Other
researchers suggest that ADHD is the result of poor dietary habits,
28which can also account for generational patterns of the condition.
Some of the most popular scientific explanations for the condition
come from studies that implicate neurotransmitter deficits, genetics,
and perinatal complications.29
The distinct symptoms of ADHD are revealed through its name:
attention deficit and hyperactivity-impulsivity. 30  Although the
symptoms often occur simultaneously, both do not have to be present
for a diagnosis." The symptoms may manifest themselves in a variety
of ways. For example, symptoms of hyperactivity include excessive
restlessness and the recurring desire to walk and run around.32
Moreover, some ADHD persons can be fidgety, interruptive,
incapable of awaiting their turn, and act on impulse regardless of the
consequences.33 Although many of these symptoms may be considered
24. Id.
25. Id. at 21-22.
26. Id. Between ten and thirty-five percent of children with ADHD have a
first- degree relative with past or present ADHD. Additionally, approximately
half of all parents who have the condition have a child with ADHD. See ADHD
Hearings, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Nakamura, Acting
Director, National Institute of Mental Health, Nationall Institute of Health, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services).
27. See HARTMANN, supra note 2, at 22.
28. Id.
29. See ADHD Hearings, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Dr. Richard K.
Nakamura, Acting Director, National Institute of Mental Health, National




33. Id. See also ADHD Hearings, supra note 3, at 122-23 (statement of Dr.
David Fassler, American Psychiatric Association) (citing diagnostic criteria for
ADHD).
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normal, particularly for children, they occur more frequently for those
diagnosed with ADHD and interfere with the person's normal
functioning capability. 4  Overall, hyperactivity symptoms tend to
diminish with age and are often associated with the development of
other disorders such as depression and anxiety, although the exact
cause of this relationship is unknown.35
Inattention symptoms, on the other hand, are likely to endure into
adulthood.36 Like hyperactivity, people exhibit inattention symptoms
in many different ways. Typically, ADHD individuals have problems
following through on instructions, paying close attention, being
patient, recording important details, organizing themselves, engaging
in tasks that require sustained mental effort, and appearing to be easily
distracted or forgetful 7 Though much debate exists over the number
and types of symptoms one must exhibit to be classified as ADHD, the
presence of chronic and pervasive behavioral patterns is "critical to the
diagnosis.
38
Perhaps what makes ADHD such an interesting case study are the
unknowns of the condition and the common features it shares with
normal human behavior. As one ADHD expert noted, "If AD[H]D is
a genetic disease or an abnormality, it's a popular one, possibly
afflicting as many as 25 million individuals in the United States."'3 9
With such a wide distribution among the population, is it reasonable to
conclude that ADHD qualifies as a legal disability?4° Indeed, the
symptoms of ADHD are not uncommon. "Everybody suffers from
some of these symptoms some of the time., 4' However, it is the
frequency with which these symptoms occur and the interference with
34. See ADHD Hearings, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Dr. Richard K.
Nakamura, Acting Director, National Institute of Mental Health, National
Institute of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 122-23 (statement of Dr. David Fassler, American Psychiatric
Association) (citing diagnostic criteria for ADHD).
38. Id.
39. See HARTMANN, supra note 2, at 22.
40. Some medical professionals have already made this radical jump and
assume that disability laws cover ADHD. See, e.g., NADEAU, supra note 4, at 8
("And we now have laws, covering both children and adults, that require schools
and employers, among others, to respond to the needs of those with AD[H]D.").
41. BPhoenix, Symptoms of ADHD, at http://www.angelfire.com/
home/bph oenixl/adhdsymp.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
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the ability to function normally in a work environment that sets
ADHD sufferers apart 2
No matter how one views the condition, recognition of ADHD as a
medical disorder has increased, and the demand for adult services has
grown enormously in response to recent awareness "that AD[H]D
affects people of all ages., 43 As ADHD advocates attempt to advance
their cause, they are encouraging adult workers to consider their legal
options under the ADA and proposing guaranteed legal protections
for ADHD employees in the workplace. 44 Consequently, federal
courts have seen an increased number of cases filed in which ADHD
adults have attempted to assert disability rights under the ADA 5
The issue is unsettled on whether courts are likely to recognize
ADHD as a legal disability. Although ADHD traits can make the
workplace a difficult and trying environment,46 employers still have the
right to discipline their employees based on patterns of misbehavior or
poor productivity.4 7 While many diagnosed with ADHD claim that
their condition causes poor work performance, it is often difficult if not
impossible for employers to distinguish behaviors that should be
attributed to ADHD from those that should not.48 Furthermore,
disagreement over whether ADHD constitutes a medical disorder or
normal human behavior has left its legal status unresolved. 49 How
should the law treat this unique condition? The first and most
important step is to determine whether an individual has a disability
42. See id.
43. See NADEAU, supra note 4, at 5.
44. Id. at 208-14.
45. See supra note 11.
46. See generally NADEAU, supra note 4; WEISS, supra note 7.
47. See, e.g., Lileikis v. SBC Ameritech, Inc., 84 Fed. Appx. 645, 650 (7th Cir.
2003) ("[T]ermination [was] clearly justified by [employee's] awful attendance
record.").
48. See Lois Bartels, Coping with ADHD at Work, at http://www.madison.com/
captimes/features/expert/48427.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2004) ("[M]any employers
feel that disorders that don't make one look physically different are just excuses
for poor work performance. It is easy for employers to understand how special
accommodations are necessary for someone who is blind or paralyzed. It is harder
for the same people to understand that employees with ADHD need support
too.").
49. See Ferrell v. Howard Univ., No. CIV.A.98-1009, 1999 WL 1581759, at *2
(D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1999) ("Courts are divided on the issue of whether ADD is a
disability under the ADA.").
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under the ADA. 0 Such a finding is a matter of legal analysis, and
courts have begun to apply the disability standard to ADHD
51
complaints more frequently in recent years.
II. APPLYING THE LEGAL DISABILITY STANDARD TO ADHD
Under the ADA, an individual must first establish that he or she has
12
a legal disability. For most causes of action this requires the
individual to demonstrate "[a] physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities .... , It is14
important to remember that the definition of disability is a legal one.
As such, a mere diagnosis of ADHD is not determinative of an
individual's disability status55 as some advocates might suggest.
6
Instead, the Supreme Court has noted that coverage under the ADA
depends upon an "individualized inquiry that is particular to the facts
of each case. 5 7 This requires a careful examination of the criteria "to
50. See discussion infra Part II.
51. See discussion infra Part III.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2002).
53. Id. (emphasis added). This covers ADHD employees who complain of
discrimination on the basis of a present disability. However, legal disability status
under the ADA is also available for employees who demonstrate "a record of such
an impairment" or that he or she is "regarded by the employer as having such an
impairment." Id. Because most ADHD complaints involve a present disability,
this Note will focus on the findings of those particular cases.
54. See Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 155 n.18 (1st Cir. 1998)
(quoting DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS -
FOURTH EDITION (DSM-IV) at xxiii (American Psychiatric Association, 1994))
[hereinafter DSM-IV] ("In determining whether an individual meets a specified
legal standard... additional information is usually required beyond that contained
in the DSM-IV diagnosis .. ").
55. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185 (2002) ("It is
insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test to
merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.").
56. See NADEAU, supra note 4, at 6 ("Now that we understand much more
about how to help individuals with ADD and have passed legal mandates to assist
both children and adults with ADD, there is a strong incentive for those with the
disorder, who have always been with us, to be diagnosed and to receive
treatment.") (emphasis added).
57. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
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be applied in light of the statutory language, the administrative
regulations and cases under related federal and state law." '58
A. Physical or Mental Impairment _
The starting point for analyzing whether ADHD constitutes a legal
disability is the phrase "physical or mental impairment."59  Courts
begin their analysis by looking at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations, which provide that a "'physical or
mental impairment' . . . [is] any physiological disorder . . . or any
mental or psychological disorder."6  Although ADHD is a widely
studied mental condition, this analysis requires a determination of
whether it qualifies as a mental disorder. EEOC regulations state that
mental or psychological disorders include emotional or mental illnesses
as well as specific learning disabilities.6t  While ADHD is not
mentioned as a specific mental or psychological disorder within the
regulations, the EEOC emphasizes that the ADA does not adopt a
62"laundry list" approach, leaving open the possibility for ADHD to
qualify as an impairment under the ADA.6
Most of the cases that discuss ADHD as a potential disability do not
spend much time on the "impairment" portion of the analysis6 as
58. See JONATHAN R. MOOK, 1 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT:
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES 3-1 (MB 2002).
59. Id. at 3-12.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2002) (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(ii) (2002); see also Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119
F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir. 1997) ("As the EEOC's interpretive guidance makes plain,
the ADA does not attempt to set forth a laundry list of impairments ...."); Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The ADA and this
part, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not attempt a 'laundry list' of
impairments .... ).
63. The impairment portion of the analysis is an important step that should be
addressed more adequately by the courts. As one author notes: "[T]he statutory
language of the ADA is not clear regarding the 'mental impairments' intended by
Congress to be protected under the Act." Lanetti, supra note 1, at 249. At best,
the judicial approaches to determining mental impairments have been inconsistent.
See id.
64. See, e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 83 (10th Cir. 2003) (moving
directly to the substantial limitation portion of disability analysis); Bercovitch v.
Baldwin Sch. Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 155 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating only that plaintiff may
have an impairment); Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th
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ADHD is a medically diagnosed condition frequently associated with
mental or emotional health." Because "mental or psychological
disorders" can include any number of conditions, courts have broadly
interpreted the term "mental impairment," offering deference to
medical opinion.66 Therefore, ADHD will likely qualify as a mental
impairment most of the time.67 Considering these holdings, ADHD
seems to meet the prescribed standard for "impairment" because the
68
EEOC's list of mental disorders is not exhaustive.
However, it is also possible to argue that an individual's ADHD
does not qualify as a legal impairment under the ADA. While many
analysts might be willing to cede this potential argument because of
the medical community's recognition, it is certainly within an
employer's analytical arsenal. 69  This is possible because EEOC
regulations do not list ADHD specifically as an impairment. Rather,
Cir. 1998) (stating without discussion that there is "no dispute that AD[H]D
qualifies as an impairment for purposes of the statute"); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145
F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998) (no discussion of impairment standard).
65. The American Psychiatric Association has classified ADHD as a "mental
disorder" in DSM-IV. DSM-IV, supra note 54.
66. See Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Medically diagnosed mental conditions are impairments under the ADA.");
Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059
(7th Cir. 1998) (stating "[m]edically diagnosed mental conditions" are impairments
under the ADA).
67. See supra notes 64-66. This conclusion seems logical given courts' general
willingness to defer to the medical community on what constitutes an impairment
and the little amount of time that is traditionally spent on the impairment portion
of the analysis. In effect, courts often assume without deciding that medically
diagnosed conditions constitute impairments. Case law demonstrates that ADHD,
as a medically diagnosed condition, has been afforded this benefit of the doubt.
See, e.g., Davidson, 133 F.3d at 506 ("There is no dispute that ADD qualifies as an
impairment for purposes of the statute."); Bercovitch, 133 F.3d at 155 (finding that
a plaintiff diagnosed with ADHD may have a mental impairment within the
meaning of the statute); Kohn v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 393, 413
(D.N.J. 1999) ("Most courts which have addressed this issue have concluded that
ADD and ADHD qualify as mental impairments under the ADA.").
68. See Bercovitch, 133 F.3d at 155 n.18 ("Although the relevant regulations do
not specifically list ADHD as an included physical or mental impairment, the list is
not exhaustive and includes 'any mental or psychological disorder such as mental
retardation... emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities ... )
(citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2002)).
69. See Kohn, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 413 ("This Circuit has not squarely addressed
whether ADD or the related condition, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD"), qualifies as an impairment within the meaning of Section 12101(2).").
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the regulations discuss how a mental impairment includes "[a]ny
mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation .
emotional or mental illness."70 It is true that ADHD is listed as a
"mental disorder" in the American Psychiatric Association's Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth Edition (DSM-IV),71 a general
reference utilized by courts for disability issues.72 However, the DSM-
IV cautions that a medical diagnosis should not be equated with a
qualifying legal impairment:
[There is an] imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate
concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical
diagnosis [,] in most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a
DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the
existence for legal purposes of a 'mental disorder,' 'mental
disability,' 'mental disease, ' or 'mental defect.' In determining
whether an individual meets a specified legal standard . . .
additional information is usually required beyond that contained
in the DSM-IV diagnosis . . . . It is precisely because
impairments, abilities, and disabilities vary widely within each
diagnostic category that assignment of a particular diagnosis
does not imply a specific level of impairment or disability.
73
As DSM-IV openly recognizes, arguing against a medical diagnosis
as an impairment is plausible because the term "mental impairment" is
a legal definition, not a medical one. Consequently, the history of
disability law suggests there is a difference between a medical
condition affecting a bodily system that represents some form of
"diminution in value, quality, excellence or strength,, 74 and a medical
condition affecting a bodily system that falls within the normal range
70. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2002).
71. See DSM-IV, supra note 54, at xxiii.
72. See Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 1995) ("A
court may give weight to a diagnosis of mental disorders of the American
Psychiatric Association."); see also EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
ADA AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 3 (1997) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE],
available at http:www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004)
(discussing how "DSM-IV has been recognized as an important reference by
courts").
73. DSM-IV, supra note 54, at xxiii.
74. MOOK, supra note 58, at 3-16. These conditions would seem to fall within
the fundamental spirit of the ADA in providing coverage to "individuals with
limitations that are generally targeted for discrimination and exclusion" and who
are "the most needy and deserving." See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and
Title I of the ADA, 52 AMER. U. L. REV. 1213, 1221 (2003).
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of human behaviors." This notion is supported by case law examining
the "mental impairment" standard.7 ' For example, in Forrisi v.
Bowen77 the court noted: "The very concept of an impairment implies a
characteristic that is not commonplace and that poses for the particular
individual a more general disadvantage in his or her search for
satisfactory employment. 7 8  More recently, a federal court in the
District of Maryland elaborated on the need to distinguish between
conditions of normal human behavior and mental impairments by
stating "'personality traits that are commonplace or characteristics
within the normal range' that are not symptoms of a mental or
psychological disorder are not impairments afforded protection under
the ADA."'7 9
In the case of an individual diagnosed with ADHD, it is possible for
a court to find that an employee's condition is not a mental impairment
if it can be shown that his condition had little or no impact on his
bodily activities and falls within a normal range of human
75. See MOOK, supra note 58, at 3-16. For the purposes of this analysis, see
supra notes 41-42 (describing how ADHD symptoms are exhibited by all human
beings). Including medical conditions that fall within a normal range of human
behaviors would likely diminish the significance of providing coverage to
individuals who need it the most. Expanding the disability definition to include
such conditions frustrates the ADA's goal of "corrective justice" by focusing less
attention on those with truly debilitating conditions and increasing costs associated
with litigation in an overcrowded court system. See Hoffman, supra note 74, at
1221-22.
76. See MOOK, supra note 58, at 3-16. It is important to recognize that the
ADA's definition of the term "disability" is inherited from its previous definition
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Kiren D. Zucker, The Meaning of Life:
Defining "Major Life Activities" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 86
MARQ. L. REV. 957 (2003) ("In defining disability under the ADA, Congress
turned to the definition of what it means to be handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973."). Thus, any case history that is cited prior to the
ADA's passage in 1990 refers to decisions made under the Rehabilitation Act.
77. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
78. MOOK, supra note 58, at 3-16 (citing Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934; E.E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097-98 (D. Haw. 1980)) (impairment defined
as "any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an
individual's health or physical or mental activity").
79. Tozzi v. Advanced Med. Mgmt., No. SOO-2363, 2001 WL 1081175, at *5 (D.
Md. May 24, 2001).
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behavior(s). ° For example, an ADHD employee may claim that his
condition caused loss of focus, distraction, irritability, increased stress
levels, anxiety, depression, and sleep deprivation, all of which
constitute symptoms of ADHD." However, what makes ADHD
uniquely susceptible to an impairment challenge is that most people in
the general population experience "some of these symptoms some of
the time., 82 To counter the employee's claim of impairment based
upon a medical diagnosis, an employer could inquire about the
acuteness of the symptoms and whether they are mild, moderate, or
severe. Furthermore, it may be possible to utilize expert witnesses
who would characterize the individual's condition as an exhibition of
''personality traits" or "behaviors" falling within the normal range of
human activity."
This point is not merely academic because courts have questioned
whether a diagnosis by a doctor is sufficient to establish a mental
impairment within the meaning of the ADA. One case that
demonstrates this is Williams v. New York State Department of Labor.84
Here, an employee with a stress-related mental condition filed a
complaint against the State of New York for discrimination in violation
of the ADA. 85 The court found that "the record presented by [the]
Plaintiff of her impairment" was "unconvincing" at best, 8 despite the
fact that a medical doctor had diagnosed the plaintiff with a
"psychiatric disorder of depression and anxiety."87 The court stated
that the evidence of an impairment was insufficient as it "offered little
or no testimony as to [the] Plaintiff's individual symptoms or
80. While ADHD cases are relatively new to employment litigation, at least
one court has left open the possibility that ADHD does not amount to an
impairment. See supra note 69.
81. See ADHD Hearings, supra note 3, at 122-23 (statement of Dr. David
Fassler, American Psychiatric Association) (citing DSM-IV diagnostic symptoms
for ADHD).
82. See supra note 41.
83. See MOOK, supra note 58, at 3-20 (citing EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 72,
at 4) (stating that personality traits such as stress, irritability, chronic lateness, or
poor judgment are not mental impairments).
84. No. 98-3816, 2000 WL 33175735, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2000). Although
this case does not involve an individual diagnosed with ADHD, the logic of the
argument could be applied to an ADHD case and highlights the importance of
establishing a record with facts that demonstrate a condition outside the normal
range of human behavior.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *9.
87. Id.
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functional limitations, except that 'she had poor concentration,' 'was
feeling sad,' and 'wasn't motivated."' Additionally, a licensed social
worker who diagnosed the plaintiff with generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD) testified that he considered the condition to be common and
diagnosed at least half of his clients with GAD.
9 Finally, the court
noted that DSM-IV warns "[i]n most situations, the clinical diagnosis
of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence
for legal purposes of a 'mental disorder'. . . ."9 In a clear criticism of
the employee's case, the court highlighted the weakness of the
impairment claim.
At the same time, the Williams case exemplifies the inherent
difficulty associated with challenging the impairment status of a
medical diagnosis. Notwithstanding the questionable evidence, the
court assumed for purposes of summary judgment that plaintiff had
established a mental impairment (dismissing the case instead for a
failure to demonstrate substantial limitation of a major life activity).
91
This generosity can be attributed to the fact that courts grant
deference to the "mental impairments" listed in DSM-IV.
92 As for
ADHD, its own listing in the DSM-IV bodes well for complainants
seeking to meet the impairment standard. Furthermore, ADHD has
the potential to abnormally affect a number of bodily activities such as
thinking, concentrating, and sleeping, increasing the likelihood of a
mental impairment.93 To date, no case law exists challenging ADHD's
status as an impairment. Nonetheless, each ADHD complaint must be
examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the condition
falls within the normal range of human behaviors, a step that is often
overlooked in ADA analysis.
B. Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity
Once a determination is made that an employee's medical condition
constitutes an impairment under the ADA, the analytical focus shifts
to whether the individual is substantially limited in the performance of
a major life activity. The Supreme Court's recent disability decision in
88. Id.
89. Williams, 2000 WL 33175735, at *9.
90. Id. at *9 n.18.
91. Id at *10.
92. See materials cited supra note 72.
93. See generally WEISS, supra note 7, at 10-36. These bodily activities should
not be confused with major life activities that are discussed in the upcoming
section.
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Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams94 clarified a number
of important factors with respect to this aspect of the "disability"
definition. The Court's guidance suggested that "disability" was not an
open-ended meaning, but rather an "exacting definition." 95 In this
regard, ADHD complainants must meet a "demanding standard 9 6 that
will depend primarily upon two issues of law: identifying what
constitutes a "major life activity" for purposes of the ADA, and
whether the individual's major life activity has been substantially
limited by ADHD.9
First, the employee complainant must identify a valid major life
activity. Prior to Toyota, employee causes of action frequently cited
working as a major life activity. 98 This can be credited to the EEOC,
which lists "working" among the various major life activities contained
in its regulations." However, Toyota has cast some doubt on the
EEOC's interpretation." ° In her opinion, Justice O'Connor left open
the issue of whether working should be considered a major life activity
at all, commenting that the Court had "been hesitant to hold as much,
and we need not decide this difficult question today."10 1 Although it
has shown wide deference to EEOC's regulations concerning such
major life activities, the Court reserved the right to judge whether the
94. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
95. See MOOK, supra note 58, at 3-42.
96. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. at 197 ("That these
terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying
as disabled is confirmed by the first section of the ADA, which lays out the
legislative findings and purposes that motivate the Act.").
97. Id. at 194-95; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (setting
forth a three-part test for disability under the statute).
98. Prior to Toyota, complainants could rely on "the long history of
recognizing working as a major life activity" under the ADA and its "statutory
forerunner," the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Mark C. Radhert, Arline's Ghost:
Some Notes on Working as a Major Life Activity Under the ADA, 9 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 303, 306 (2000). See also Katherine R. Annas, Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams: Part of an Emerging Trend of Supreme
Court Cases Narrowing the Scope of the ADA, 81 N.C. L. REV 835, 850 (2003)
("Courts reviewing decisions under the ADA have relied upon 'working' as a
major life activity more than any other major life activity ... .
99. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002).
100. Annas, supra note 98, at 850 ("Another possible consequence of Toyota is
the erosion of 'working' as a major life activity.").
101. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200.
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EEOC had properly interpreted the major life activity requirement.
02
Furthermore, the Toyota Court announced unequivocally that a major
life activity is one that is of "central importance" to most people's daily
lives.
0 3
Ironically, while Toyota had the practical effect of limiting the
number of individuals who qualified as disabled under the ADA,'0 its
preference for major life activities outside the workplace might have
the "perverse effect of making it more difficult for employers to
determine who is and who is not covered by the ADA statutory
requirements."'0' 5 For ADHD cases, it forces complainants to consider
other widely recognized major life activities such as caring for one's
self, learning, and speaking. '0 The more intriguing inquiry as to major
life activities comes when considering those activities that are not
mentioned specifically within EEOC regulations.'O° The following
activities have received mixed reviews in various jurisdictions:
concentrating and thinking,'s interacting with others,'9 and reading."0
102. Id. See also ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)) ("When Congress expressly delegates to an administrative agency the
authority to make specific policy determinations, courts must give the agency's
decision controlling weight unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute."').
103. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 185.
104. Annas, supra note 98, at 835-36 ("Toyota's holding furthers the emerging
Supreme Court trend to decrease the number of Americans with disabilities
covered by the ADA.").
105. See MOOK, supra note 58, at 3-42.
106. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002) (naming "caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working" as major life activities). Although not binding, many circuits afford
"great deference" to the EEOC's interpretation of disability, including the term
"major life activity." Thus, these activities are widely recognized and employees
are likely to utilize them in their complaints. See Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 226 F.3d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing "major life activities per se").
107. As noted in Bragdon, the EEOC's list is illustrative but not exhaustive.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. However, activities that are not listed within the EEOC
regulations carry less consensus and are subject to greater scrutiny.
108. At least two circuits have acknowledged that "concentrating" and
"thinking" are major life activities within the meaning of the ADA. See Gagliardo
v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing
"concentrating" and "remembering" as major life activities); Brown v. Cox, 286
F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging "thinking" and "cognitive thought"
as major life activities); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. 184 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir.
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Because many people in the general population frequently endure
substantial degrees of disruption each day in the course of such
activities, some jurisdictions are hesitant to characterize them as
1999) (holding "thinking" is a major life activity). Additionally, it is the position of
the EEOC that "concentration" and "thinking" are major life activities. See
EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 3. Because "thinking" and "concentrating"
are general activities that may not meet the "central importance" test outlined in
Toyota, other circuits have questioned their use as major life activities. See Pack v.
Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[cloncentration
may be a significant and necessary component of a major life activity, such as
working, learning, or speaking, but it is not an 'activity' itself."); Boerst v. Gen.
Mills Operations, Inc., 25. Fed. Appx. 403, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Neither
concentrating nor stamina qualify as major life activities under the ADA."); Hill v.
Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 54 Fed. Appx. 199, 200 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding it
doubtful that "thinking" constitutes a major life activity).
109. Once again, there is a split among the circuits on whether this constitutes a
major life activity. Compare McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226,
1234 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Because interacting with others is an essential, regular
function, like walking and breathing, it easily falls within the definition of 'major
life activity."') and MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 337 (6th
Cir. 2002) ("We note that it has been held that 'interacting with others' is a major
life activity.") with Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997)
(rejecting the claim that the "inability to interact with others" implicated a major
life activity under the ADA) and Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 n.4 (4th
Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted) ("This argument approaches a claim that the ability
to get along with others is a major life activity, a claim about which we have some
doubt.").
110. While many jurisdictions have included reading as an element of
"learning" or "working," at least two circuits have held that "reading" by itself
constitutes a major life activity. See Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 226
F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (major life activities include reading); see also Gonzales
v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 225 F.3d 620, 626 (6th Cir. 2000). However, the Fifth
Circuit has called this conclusion into question. See Hileman v. City of Dallas,
Texas, 115 F.3d 352, 354 n.44 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that plaintiff directed the
court to no authority suggesting that "reading" is in fact a major life activity).
Some complainants have argued that the ability to read continuously for an entire
day constitutes a major life activity. However, the ability to read all day long has
not been recognized as a separate major life activity. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 291 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2002) (the ability to read all day long is not a major
life activity). As Judge Posner notes, recognizing the ability to read all day long as
a major life activity could cause a very large fraction of the workforce to be
disabled as many people experience difficulty reading for prolonged periods. See
id. at 957. Because many people sustain this discomfort, yet function effectively, it
is doubtful that it carries a "central importance" to most people's daily lives and
would not constitute a major life activity.
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having "a central importance" to most people's daily lives. "
Nonetheless, ADHD employees complain that the condition inhibits
their ability to perform these tasks.12
Yet it is not enough to show that an impairment simply affects a
judicially recognized major life activity. The complainant must also
demonstrate that their condition has caused a "substantial limitation"
in such activity. In Toyota, the Court addressed this issue as well,
stating that the term "substantially limits" means "considerable" or "to
a large degree., 113 The Court noted that this requires an individual to
"have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual"
from performing major life activities. 114 Moreover, the impairment
must be "permanent or long term...... Ultimately, Toyota precludes
impairments that interfere in only a "minor way.', 1 6 However, ADHD
complainants can still show that their limitations exceed those of the
general population and substantially limit a major life activity.' 7 This
can be a daunting task in light of the fact that a number of their
symptoms are commonly shared to some degree by all 
people. 8
On the whole, Toyota presented a clearer framework for
determining an individual's disability status by providing guidance on
111. This follows the logic that if activities were of "central importance," then
people would not put up with the frequent interference of their performance.
112. See cases cited supra note 11.
113. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 186 (2002).
114. Id. at 185.
115. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (2002)). The Court references EEOC
regulations to assist with interpretation of "substantially limits." Toyota, 534 U.S.
at 185. EEOC regulations define "substantially limits" as "unable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform;
or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform that same major life activity." Id. To determine whether an
individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the EEOC
regulations provide courts with the following factors to consider: (i) the nature and
severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. Id.
116. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 185.
117. See Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Clear Creek, 281 F.3d. 1148, 1158
(10th Cir. 2002) ("Determining both how well 'the average person in the general
population' performs any given major life activity and whether the plaintiff has
proven he is 'unable to perform' or is 'significantly restricted' in performing a
major life activity involves weighing evidence and assessing credibility of witnesses
118. See BPhoenix, supra note 41, at 1.
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what constitutes a valid major life activity and what it means to be
substantially limited in the performance of that major life activity. The
next section will look at trends that have emerged as courts apply
Toyota to ADHD employees.
III. EMERGING TRENDS IN ADHD WORKPLACE COMPLAINTS
A. Pre-Toyota
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Toyota, establishing a
"disability" for ADHD employees was an uphill battle. Pre-Toyota
appellate cases focused mostly on well-established major life activities
such as working, learning, and speaking. This is demonstrated through
two decisions handed down in the Seventh Circuit: Davidson v.
Midelfort Clinic, Ltd."9 and Paul v. Wisconsin Department of Industry,
Labor & Human Relations.
2 0
In Davidson, a medical clinic psychotherapist brought a disability
discrimination and retaliation claim under the ADA against her
former employer. 2' The plaintiff was diagnosed with ADHD and
complained that it inhibited her ability to take timely dictation, a
formal requirement of her job. 2 2 The district court entered summary
judgment for the employer and the former employee appealed.23
The court of appeals held that the plaintiff's impairment of ADHD
124did not pose a significant limitation on her ability to work. While
ADHD might have impacted the employee's ability to take timely
dictation, the record did not suggest that ADHD posed other
limitations on her ability to function effectively as a counselor or that
she was precluded from holding other comparable positions as a
therapist. ' The court of appeals also held that the plaintiff's ADHD
did not substantially limit the major life activity of speaking because
the record revealed no limitations in this regard, and most people who
speak do not have a need to dictate in their day-to-day
119. 133 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1998) (focusing on the major life activities of
working, learning, and speaking).
120. No. 9804955, 1999 WL 685912 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 1999) (focusing on the
major life activity of working).
121. Davidson, 133 F.3d at 502.
122. Id. at 503-04.
123. Id. at 502.
124. Id. at 506-07.
125. Id.
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communications. 1 6  Finally, the court of appeals found that the
plaintiff's ADHD did not substantially limit her ability to learn
because she did not offer sufficient proof of this limitation.1 27 The
plaintiff's "oblique references" to her own impatience and frequent
questioning of clinic policies were not enough to establish that she had
an ongoing, substantial limitation on her ability to learn.'
28
Another Seventh Circuit decision demonstrating the difficulty of
establishing a substantial limitation of an employee's ability to work
was Paul v. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human
Relations.129 Here, a Wisconsin state employee was diagnosed in 1994
as suffering from ADHD. Due to her inability to perform certain
functions, she was discharged in 1995.13° The employee claimed that
her employer failed to accommodate her disability. 3' The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court decision to award summary
judgment in favor of the employer because the employee did not raise
a material issue of fact as to whether her ADHD substantially limited
her ability to work. 3 2 The district court noted that the employee "had
not submitted sufficient evidence from which it could be inferred that
her ADHD prevented her from performing a class or broad range of
jobs.' 33 The Seventh Circuit agreed. 34
Specifically, the employee relied upon a psychologist's report that
diagnosed her as having ADHD. The report stated that her ADHD
126. Davidson, 133 F.3d at 507.
127. Id. at 508. it is important to note that the court did not find sufficient
evidence of a present disability. However, the court did remand on the issue of
whether or not Mrs. Davidson established a "record" of an impairment that
substantially limited her ability to learn. Id. at 509-10. For the purposes of this
paper, an employee's record of disability is not being investigated, as most ADHD
cases are filed by individuals with a present disability. See supra text
accompanying note 53. However, it should be highlighted that Mrs. Davidson did
note with "specificity" the number of ways in which her past "learning-related
limitations manifested themselves," demonstrating sufficient evidence of a "history
of an impairment substantially limiting her ability to learn." Davidson, 133 F.3d at
510 (emphasis added). Such a record of particularity could prove useful in present
disability cases. See infra note 138.
128. Davidson, 133 F.3d at 508.
129. No. 9804955, 1999 WL 685912 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 1999).
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id. at *2-3.
133. Id. at *2.
134. Paul. No. 9804955. 1999 WL 685912. at *2.
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"may well be" a factor that "interfered with job performance. 135
However, the psychologist did not address whether the employee
would be restricted in a "broad class of positions" that would
otherwise demonstrate a substantial limitation.1 36 The psychologist
even suggested that the employee pursue other job possibilities and
opportunities and recommended "the use of [Ms. Paul's] strengths for
a return to a placement with the state utilizing her verbal and cognitive
skills." 37
While the Seventh Circuit cases clearly bode well for employers, at
least one pre-Toyota case favored an ADHD complainant. In Criado118
v. IBM Corp. , a former employee diagnosed with ADHD brought
suit against her employer, alleging that she was terminated in violation
of the ADA.3 9 Although the court focused on the employee's ADHD,
as it compounded her depression and anxiety (other impairments), it
found that collectively the impairments posed a substantial limitation
to major life activities.' 4° With little discussion on the particulars, the
First Circuit stated that Criado presented evidence showing "that her
mental impairments had substantially limited her ability to work, sleep
and relate to others.' 14' However, it remains to be seen whether
employee-complainants can rely upon the outcome in Criado. In its
post-Toyota decisions, the First Circuit has considered two ADHD
cases and ruled against employees both times, highlighting the lack of
141evidentiary support for the plaintiffs' disability claims.
The other pre-Toyota cases illustrate the ongoing difficulty
associated with ADHD complaints: plaintiffs diagnosed with ADHD
have generally failed to articulate their substantial limitation with
sufficient "particularity., 143 This requires evidence that goes beyond a
mere showing of limitation, but rather demonstrates "severity" and
"permanence."' 44 In other words, these ADHD cases have lacked the
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *3.
138. 145 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998).
139. Id. at 439.
140. See id. at 442.
141. Id.
142. See discussion infra Part III.B.2
143. See Li v. Intel Corp., 35 Fed. Appx. 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2002) (ADHD
employee brought suit against employer for wrongful discrimination under the
ADA. The employee's alleged disability failed because she "fail[ed] to support
her contention with particularity.").
144. See MOOK,supra note 58, at 3-35.
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kind of factual record that would support such a finding.4 1 The
Supreme Court has stated that even if working is considered a major
life activity, a complainant would be required to show that he or she is
restricted in a "broad range of jobs" rather than a particular job. 4' For
the most part, records in pre-Toyota cases have established that
employees can experience a limited interference with a specific type of
job,147 but they have failed to allege restrictions in any class of jobs.'4
As for other major life activities, the records have sometimes
lacked any evidentiary support whatsoever, such as Mrs. Davidson's
alleged difficulty with speaking. 49  This lack of detailed evidentiary
support is a far cry from establishing the type of severity that the ADA
requires.
B. Recent Appellate Cases
In 2003, several important cases were handed down in the First and
Tenth Circuits regarding individuals with ADHD who filed claims
under the ADA: McCrary v. Aurora Public Schools,"' Doeble v.
Sprint/United Management. Co.,"' Calef v. Gillette Co.,15 Wright v.
Comp USA, Inc. 1 3 and Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc. '1 4 On the whole, the
cases illustrate some ongoing difficulties associated with ADHD
complaints and the struggle to establish ADHD as a legal disability.
Specifically, both circuits seem to suggest that ADHD complaints
145. However, see supra note 127 for an illustration of sufficient evidence in
establishing a "record" of substantial impairment.
146. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002).
147. This would not include Criado, as the First Circuit found the employee was
substantially limited in a major life activity. See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d
437, 442 (1st Cir. 1998).
148. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1998)
("Davidson has come forward with no evidence from which one might reasonably
infer that AD[H]D precluded her even from holding other comparable positions as
a therapist."); Paul v. Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, No.
9804955, 1999 WL 685912, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug 24 1999) ("[Employee's ADHD]
was not likely to greatly limit her ability to function within a specific occupational
capacity or a broad array of other employment opportunities .....
149. Davidson, 133 F.3d at 507.
150. 57 Fed. Appx. 362 (10th Cir. 2003).
151. 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003).
152. 322 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2003).
153. 352 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2003).
154. 345 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2003).
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generally fall short on their factual records by failing to show the
condition results in a substantial limitation of a major life activity.55
1. The Tenth Circuit in 2003
In McCrary v. Aurora Public Schools, an elementary school teacher
brought an action against her employer and its personnel under the
ADA, claiming discrimination on the basis of her ADHD and learning
disabilities.' Specifically, the plaintiff complained that the school
forced her to take disability retirement after refusing to accommodate
her condition.5 7 The district court awarded summary judgment to the
employer on the grounds that the plaintiff-employee failed to establish
a disability; the employee then appealed.58
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the employee's ADHD did not
substantially limit the major life activity of working because she did
not present evidence that she was unable to perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs.5 9 Additionally, the plaintiff did not
demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the ability to think or
learn because her deficits were within the average range and she was
functioning at or above average compared to the general population
(although on a particular day she might not be functioning at that
level).' 6° Finally, the court reiterated its stance that concentration is
not a major life activity although it may be a component of some other
activity such as working or learning.
6
1
The Doeble case is noteworthy because it demonstrates how a
company can struggle to balance the needs of an ADHD individual
with a company's right to discipline its employees. Here, defendant
Sprint placed plaintiff Doeble, a financial analyst, in a department
characterized by its negative work environment. Many employees in
the department did not get along and "rumors and gossip" were known
to flow throughout the employee ranks.
63
Management initially reprimanded Doeble for improper email
usage, tardiness, and confrontational encounters with other employees,
155. See Doeble, 342 F.3d at 1130-31; Calef, 322 F.3d at 84-86; Wright, 352 F.3d
at 477; Whitlock, 345 F.3d at 46.
156. 57 Fed. Appx. 362 (10th Cir. 2003).
157. Id. at 366.
158. Id. at 370.
159. Id. at 371.
160. Id.
161. Mcrary, 57 Fed. Appx. at 370.
162. Doeble v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir. 2003).
163. Id.
2004] Working Towards a Better Understanding of ADHD 91
which the company considered "inappropriate behavior."'4 The
company later learned she was diagnosed with ADHD. Management
also issued a verbal warning and two written warnings, and extended
her leave period to help remedy her stress and 
relational difficulties.
165
Nine months after her initial warning, Doeble was terminated for
"attendance problems and lack of personal effectiveness.,
16
Doeble filed suit against Sprint alleging unlawful discrimination
under the ADA for failure to accommodate her mental disabilities,
unlawful termination, and retaliation.1 6 ' The district court granted
summary judgment for Sprint.1 6 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found
that Doeble was not disabled under the ADA because she did not
"raise a fact issue on whether she was significantly limited in her ability
to communicate with others. 1 69 Evidence of a phone message in which
the analyst communicated with slurred speech that was "difficult to
understand" was not sufficient to meet a substantial 
limitation. 70
Further, Doeble's "interpersonal problems" with many coworkers
and subjectivity to nasty comments and jokes were not enough to
establish a substantial limitation of interacting with others.
71  The
Tenth Circuit stated that "[m]ere trouble getting along" is not
sufficient to establish a substantial limitation.
1 7
' Rather, there must be
a showing of severe levels of "hostility, social withdrawal or failure to
communicate when necessary.' ' 173 In this case, the record showed that
Doeble exhibited none of these severe impairments and was even
socially active in the community.
74
In Calef v. Gillette Co., an employee was terminated after behaving
in a threatening manner toward co-workers.
1 7
' The employee sued the
employer, claiming the employer violated the ADA by terminating his
employment and failing to reasonably accommodate him.
1 76  The
164. Id. at 1123.
165. Id. at 1123-27.
166. Id. at 1127.
167. Doeble, 342 F.3d at 1121.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1131.
170. Id.
171. Id. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit assumed, without deciding,
that interacting with others constituted a valid major life activity.
172. Doeble, 342 F.3d at 1131.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2003).
176. Id.
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district court awarded summary judgment for the employer and
dismissed the ADA claim because the employee was not substantially
limited in a major life activity. 77 The employee appealed, but the First
Circuit upheld the district court's decision.
7
1
In upholding the district court's decision, the appellate court found
that the plaintiff's ADHD did not substantially limit his major life
activity of learning because standard intelligence tests confirmed that
his overall learning ability fell within the "average range.
Furthermore, standard scholastic achievement tests demonstrated
plaintiff's "academic skills to be within the normal range for a man of
his general abilities and educational level," despite the fact that he
scored lower on some tests.'O The plaintiff's other claimed major life
activity, speaking, "fare[d] no better" because the medical evidence
showed that plaintiff's "language is normal."' 8' The court pointed to a
comprehensive assessment proving that the employee's verbal abilities
were also "within average range, including his verbal productivity,




2. The First Circuit in 2003
The First Circuit was busy reviewing ADHD claims in 2003 as well.
One case, Wright vs. Comp USA, Inc., involved a computer store sales
manager named Stephen Wright who had been diagnosed with
AD[H]D. While working for CompUSA, Wright experienced high
levels of stress and anxiety on the job that exacerbated his ADHD
symptoms.183 Wright claimed that his new general manager had caused
the increased stress levels which resulted in disruptive behavior and
numerous conflicts between the two.l4 After receiving follow-up
treatment for his ADHD, Wright's psychiatrist sent a letter to his
employer explaining his condition.8 5 Nevertheless, Wright was later
terminated for insubordination because he failed to report to another
office as instructed. 86
177. Id. at 83-86.
178. Id. at 77.
179. Id. at 84.
180. Calef, 322 F.3d at 84.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 474 (1st Cir. 2003).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 475.
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Wright filed a disability claim alleging wrongful discrimination andretaliation against the computer store. After the district courtgranted summary judgment in favor of CompUSA,'s the First Circuitaffirmed and found that Wright provided no evidence that his ADHDcaused the disruptive behavior.'8 9 The appellate court further notedthat the evidence did not demonstrate that ADHD "rendered himunable to perform some usual activity compared to the generalpopulation or that he had a continuing inability to handle stressfulsituations.'" The opinion stated that even though Wright providedsome evidence that ADHD affected many activities in his daily life, areasonable juror could not conclude that "he was substantially limitedin the major life activities of reading, speaking, concentrating, hearingand processing information, and thinking and articulating thoughts, ashe contends. '"' 9'
The First Circuit handed down a second decision regarding anADHD employee in Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc. Here, an employee ofa national laundry service provider was diagnosed with ADHD andstruggled with his ability to concentrate and focus at work.' 9 When thecompany decided to reorganize its shipping department, it dismantledpartitions around the employee's workspace and removed a radio thatwas said to be distracting to other employees.' 93 Responding to thechange in work atmosphere, the employee decided to take disabilityleave and later returned to work.' 94 On the advice of his doctor, theemployee requested that he be permitted to work four days a weekwith no overtime and resume using his radio.' 95 The company accededto both requests, but eventually the employee left his job and filed adisability claim.' 96
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment in favorof the employer, the First Circuit provided the employee the benefit ofthe doubt and assumed, without deciding, that work constituted a
197major life activity. However, the First Circuit found that the
187. Id.
188. Wright, 352 F.3d at 478.
189. Id. at 476.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 477.





197. Whitlock, 345 F.3d at 46 n.2.
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employee offered no evidence supporting his contention that he was
precluded from working in a broad class of jobs.9 8 As a matter of fact,
the court found that the record revealed the company "believed he
could do his job."' Furthermore, the employee's physician failed to
support his claim sufficiently by making a "conclusory assertion of
total disability" without sufficient backing in the record demonstrating
the "particular limitations required by Toyota."' 0
3. Synthesizing the 2003 Decisions
These recent cases demonstrate continuing problems that ADHD
employees have with establishing "particularity" in the record.20 ' In
McCrary, the ADHD employee relied upon a single doctor's
evaluation to establish that she was substantially limited in the major
life activities of thinking, learning, working and concentrating. This
doctor's testimony, coupled with his deposition, established nothing
more than the fact that the plaintiff experienced some deficits in her
ability to think and learn. Furthermore, the plaintiff's record failed to
present any evidence that she was restricted from performing a broad
range of jobs, a requirement for showing a substantial limitation in her
ability to work.
Even when records are more fully developed, Calef shows how the
employee must be substantially limited compared with the average
individual in the general population. 2 While Calef was able to present
evidence that he scored "significantly below average" on a particular
test designed to measure his resistance to distraction, it was only one
factor that was used to determine his learning ability in comparison to
the average individual . 0  A neurologist's report revealed that he was
"very effective in terms of his ability to concentrate, read, etc.," and his
previous experiences revealed his capability of learning new job
skills.2° ' It was the overall history of Calef's learning record in
198. Id. at 46.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 143.
202. See Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(1) (2002)).
203. Id. at 84-86; see also Li v. Intel Corp., 35 Fed. Appx. 677, 679 (9th Cir.
2002). This Ninth Circuit case involves an ADHD employee and stresses the same
idea that a substantial limitation must be determined by looking at how "the
average person in the general population can perform [learning]."Id.
204. Calef, 322 F.3d at 84.
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comparison to the average individual that determined the outcome of
this case. In the words of the court, "These facts doom the claim.,
20
Not all of the news is bad for ADHD employees. Because Toyota
cast some doubt on recognizing work as a major life activity, which
could limit the number of future ADHD cases, it may have forced
plaintiffs to investigate new and creative ways of establishing major life
activities outside of those recommended by the EEOC. In McCrary,
the plaintiff attempted to establish that thinking and concentrating
were major life activities, even though they are not listed within EEOC
regulations. This effort seemed to work, as the court accepted the
major life activity of "thinking." Likewise, Wright seemed to recognize
several major life activities not listed within the regulations including
reading, thinking, and articulating thoughts.2
°  Doeble recognized
interacting with others as a valid major life activity.
27 By utilizing a
variety of potential major life activities outside the EEOC regulations,
employees increase their chances of establishing a disability.
However, it must be cautioned that complainants cannot always rely
on these outside activities as courts often decline to recognize them for
failing to meet Toyota's "central importance" test.
209 This is evidenced
by the McCrary court's refusal to accept concentrating as a major life
activity.
C. Hypothesis for Claiming a Disability for 
ADHD Complainants
210
Although the case law regarding ADHD as a legal disability seems
to favor employers, there are a couple of related precedents where
employees have successfully established a legal disability. One of the
most useful cases is Criado v. IBM Corp., which was addressed earlier
in this Note. Criado is an interesting case for two reasons. First, it
was decided prior to Toyota, and it remains to be seen how appellate
courts will treat future cases that deal with working as a major life
205. Id.
206. Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir. 2003).
207. Doeble v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2003).
208. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 103.
210. It is not a forgone conclusion that ADHD will always fail to qualify as a
legal disability. See, e.g., Calef, 322 F.3d at 86 ("On different facts, ADHD might
disable an individual such that the ADA applies.").
211. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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activity.2 12 Second, it introduces additional major life activities that are
more intriguing for ADHD cases. Two of these additional major life
activities, sleeping and relating to others, are not found within the
EEOC's regulations. The First Circuit, however, seems to have no
problem recognizing their validity.
Specifically, sleeping has been widely mentioned in many circuits as
a valid major life activity2 14 and few cases expressly reject it as such.215
Given this wide jurisdictional support, sleeping likely would qualify as
a major life activity for an ADHD employee. If the employee was able
to show an adequate disruption of sleep that exceeds the average
individual in the general population, he might find more success than
with disruptions to work. Far less consensus exists, however, on
whether relating to others constitutes a valid major life activity.1 6 But,
if the employee can find a jurisdiction that recognizes it as such, he or
she would have an opportunity to develop a record that shows
substantial disruption because many ADHD symptoms such as
impulsivity and irritability inhibit interaction with others.217
212. Recall that the First Circuit passed on the determination of whether work
is a valid major life activity in Whitlock. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying
text.
213. Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 442 (1st Cir. 1998).
214. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999);
Pack v. K-Mart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Boerst v. Gen.
Mills Operations, 25 Fed. Appx. 403, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (sleeping is a major life
activity under the ADA); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352-53 (4th Cir.
2001); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998);
Criado, 145 F.3d at 442-43; Scarborough v. Natsios, 190 F. Supp. 2d 5, 21 n.14
(D.D.C. 2002) ("Although this Circuit has not addressed the issue, other circuits
have found that sleeping is a major life activity under the Act, even though it is not
named as such in the EEOC regulations.").
215. But see Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 968 F. Supp. 1026, 1035
(E.D. Pa. 1997).
Plaintiff also claims that "the mental impairment substantially limited a
major life activity, namely the ability to get a sound night's sleep and to
report work on time, clear-minded, in the morning." Plaintiff cites no
cases recognizing such a major life activity, and we find no support for
doing so here.
Id.
216. Relating to others is likely to be equated with interacting with others. See
supra note 109.
217. See discussion supra Part I.
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A second precedent that could prove useful for ADHD employees is
Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n.
l8 In this case, a medical
transcriptionist diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder brought
an action against her former employer alleging she was terminated in
violation of the ADA.219 This case is relevant because the court
recognized obsessive compulsive disorder as a mental impairment
220 in
a manner similar to cases which recognize ADHD as a mental
impairment.22 The court found that the employee was substantially
limited in caring for herself because the evidence revealed that
washing and brushing her hair alone could take several hours and that
she prepared for work from early morning until early evening.
222 Also
in support of this finding, a clinical psychiatrist testified that the
employee was rated as taking three times as long as most people to
shower, wash her hands, dress, and handle or cook food.
23
Because caring for one's self is listed directly within EEOC
regulations, an ADHD employee has an additional way to establish a
valid major life activity.224 To date there have been no appellate
decisions that involve an employee with ADHD complaining of this
restriction. This may be because the level of distraction experienced
by most ADHD employees would not severely limit their ability to
care for themselves. Still, if such an ADHD case exists, then this
recent decision in the Ninth Circuit demonstrates how an employee's
range of options in establishing a disability can be expanded.
CONCLUSION
ADHD employees face an uphill battle to establish a disability
under the ADA. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that these
218. 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).
219. Id. at 1128.
220. Id. at 1134-35.
221. See supra note 67.
222. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1131.
223. Id.
224. ADHD symptoms include being fidgety. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text. It is conceivable that severe fidgeting, particularly if combined
with other symptoms such as "excessive restlessness," could substantially interfere
with the ability to care for one's self. For example, severe fidgeting could inhibit
the individual's ability to bathe, cook or dress, just like the Humphrey case. See
239 F.3d at 1131. Whether or not there is substantial limitation depends upon the
facts supporting the record. See supra note 127.
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employees exhibit symptoms that are difficult to distinguish from
normal human behavior. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has always
preferred a review of each disability claim on a case-by-case basis.225
In determining whether an individual's condition constitutes a
mental impairment under the first step of the ADA disability analysis,
many courts recognize ADHD as an impairment based on its citation
within DSM-IV, even though the condition is not specifically listed as
an impairment under EEOC regulations. Although an argument can
be made that an individual's ADHD does not constitute a mental
impairment because it falls within the normal range of human activity,
the medical community's recognition of ADHD as a disabling
condition makes it more likely that courts will acknowledge its
impairment status.
The ADHD individual's disability status, therefore, will likely hinge
on whether ADHD complainants can establish that their condition
substantially limits a legally recognized major life activity. Based on
guidance provided by Toyota, ADHD complainants have attempted to
establish that they are substantially restricted in the major life activities
of learning, working, speaking, concentrating, sleeping, and interacting
with others. However, while some uncertainty remains over whether
each of these constitutes a major life activity, ADHD complainants
face a greater challenge in demonstrating with particularity the level of
severity required by the ADA to show substantial limitation. Unless
ADHD complainants can do a better job of making such a
demonstration as well as distinguishing their symptoms to a degree
dramatically different from the behaviors exhibited by the general
population, more often than not ADHD complainants will continue to
fail to meet the burden for establishing a disability under the ADA.
225. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
